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Abstract  
 
A key current objective of Scottish policymakers is to increase the availability of 
affordable and social housing, with an expectation that this will have both societal and 
economic impacts. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the potential economic 
impacts of meeting the projections of affordable housing needed in Scotland to 
combat homelessness. Typical economic impact assessments of social housing 
investment have focused exclusively on the effect of expenditures on demand, using 
input-output models (IO). However, recently some have argued that housing, like 
transport, should be treated as a type of infrastructure investment that is likely also 
to have potential supply side impacts – such as an increase in both labour supply and 
productivity.  In this paper, we use both IO and Computable Generable Equilibrium 
(CGE) models to evaluate the economic impact of social housing investment, with a 
particular emphasis on the supply side impacts.  
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1. Introduction and background 
 
Traditionally, the case for investment in social housing has been based around social and 
merit good arguments. Furthermore, assessments of the economic effects of such 
investments have typically been based on conventional impact analyses that focus exclusively 
on the effect of housing investment expenditures on demand. The best of these studies have 
been based on input-output (IO) models. (See e.g. National Housebuilding Federation, 2015.) 
These impact analyses typically make a number of assumptions that limit their applicability. 
The most important of these is that the host region has an entirely passive supply side. This 
has two important implications. First, the impact of the expenditure changes translate directly 
into output and employment changes: induced price and wage changes, which would be 
expected in the presence of supply constraints, are precluded. This may have the effect of 
biasing upwards the likely impacts on the real economy.  
Second, this assumption precludes the kind of beneficial supply side impacts that housing may 
be expected to generate. McLennan et al (2018a,b) argue persuasively that housing should 
be regarded as a type of infrastructure investment that is likely (in effect) to have potentially 
important beneficial supply side impacts, in a similar manner to transport investments. These 
may include, for example, labour productivity effects and savings in transport costs that 
impact labour supply. Neglecting such supply side impacts risks underestimating the 
economic impacts of housing.1  
Conventional impact analyses also typically assume that housing expenditure impacts are 
effectively instantaneous, completed within the period that the expenditure occurs, whereas 
in general, there may be legacy effects because of, for example, the costs of adjusting capital 
stocks. Furthermore, these studies usually do not attribute impacts to different sources of 
funding, and could only do so in a restrictive manner.  
In this paper we illustrate the application of a framework that allows us to relax the 
assumptions of conventional impact analyses in an illustrative study of the economic impact 
of meeting the projections of affordable housing need in Scotland provided by Dunning et al 
(2020).  
Section 2 provides a conventional impact analysis of the expenditures associated with 
meeting the projected housing need. Section 3 shows how these impacts are modified if the 
presence of capacity and labour market constraints imply likely price and wage responses to 
the housing expenditures. Section 4 considers the effect of alternative sources of funding on 
the impact of the housing expenditure. Section 5 discusses possible supply side impacts of 
meeting affordable housing needs and Section 6 is a brief conclusion. 
 
                                                          
1 However, as we show in Section 3, supply side responses may limit expenditure impacts through price and 
wage responses to demand changes. 
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2. Conventional impact analysis 
While the demand and supply effects of housing occur simultaneously, it is instructive to 
consider them separately initially to: enable comparison of conventional impact analyses with 
our alternative approach; facilitate transparency and ease of interpretation of modelling 
results; reflect the fact that we generally have better information on the expenditure than 
the supply side impacts of housing. Furthermore, we are here dealing with impacts on 
demand that are predominantly transitory in nature, namely the capital spending on new 
social housing, while supply side impacts are likely to be permanent.  
The conventional model allows us to isolate the demand effects of the temporary capital (and 
associated permanent maintenance) expenditures. We employ an augmented IO model, 
which is calibrated on the same underlying Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) database used by 
our computable general equilibrium (CGE) discussed below. This model assumes an entirely 
passive supply side, but treats income flows among households, firms and Governments more 
comprehensively than does IO, and so provides an improved analysis of changes in behaviour 
that are induced by expenditures on social housing.2 
The scale of the demand-side stimulus 
There are two elements of new expenditure associated with the planned increase in social 
housing. The estimated capital expenditure is derived in part from the report by Dunning et 
al (2020, Table 7.3, p70). They estimate that the overall requirement would be for 10,600 
units per year in each of the five years 2021-22 to 2025-26. Of these, 66% would be ‘RSL Social 
Rent’ (i.e. the favoured scenario is as per the heading of the penultimate column of Table 7.3). 
That implies (approximately) 7,000 new social rent homes per year, which are the focus of 
our analysis. The estimated cost of construction is £150,000 per unit in 2020 prices3 so that 
total capital expenditure is £1.05 billion per annum over the 5 years (7000*150,000). In 2021 
prices the annual capital spend estimate is £1083.2 million. 
The new capital spending will also generate continuing management and maintenance 
expenditure. We take as an estimate of this the £2.08k estimate reported by Scottish 
Government (2019) for Local Authority housing expenditure. In 2021 prices this is equivalent 
to £2.15k per unit of housing. Here we have 7,000 units per annum of new spending, so begins 
in year 2 with 7,000, and rises with the new stock of housing until it reaches 35,000. 
Once we have the total of new spending, its allocation across sectors is required. This we 
obtain from an earlier FAI analysis of social housing construction costs. The pattern for both 
capital (CAPEX) and maintenance (OPEX) expenditure is given in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                          
2 The model Is calibrated to a 2013 SAM for the Scottish economy. 
3 Data supplied by Shelter, but original source is the Scottish Government. 
5 
 
 
Table 1. Sectoral distribution of new capital and current expenditure on social housing.  
Industry CAPEX OPEX 
1.       Agriculture, forestry and fishing     
2.       Other primary     
3.       Food and drink     
4.       Textile, Leather, Wood, Paper, Printing     
5.       Chemicals and Pharmaceutical     
6.       Rubber, Cement, Glass, Metals     
7.       Electrical Manufacturing     
8.       Mechanical and Other Manufacturing (incl Repair)     
9.       Electricity, transmission and distribution   1.54% 
10.   Gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains; 
steam and air conditioning supply      1.54% 
11.   Water, sewerage and Waste   1.54% 
12.   Construction – Buildings 90.67% 50.95% 
13.   Wholesale and Retail Trade, Transportation and 
Storage, accommodation, food and services 1.34% 2.90% 
14.   Information and Communication 0.84% 1.36% 
15.   Financial services, insurance and services     
16.   Real Estate, professional act., R&D 7.15% 26.32% 
17.   Pub. Admin, Education and Health   13.85% 
18.   Other services     
Total 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the SAM model’s estimates of the aggregate economic impact 
of both the new capital spending on social housing and the management and maintenance 
expenditures that are likely to accompany it.  
The table separately identifies the direct, indirect and induced effects of the new expenditure 
on social housing. The direct effects reflect simply the immediate effects of the new spend on 
output, value-added and employment, reflecting the pattern of spending associated with the 
new capital and maintenance expenditures. The indirect effects capture the knock-on effects 
of these expenditures through firms’ intermediate purchases (reflecting the links in the base 
year IO table). The Type 1 entries in the table are the sum of the direct and indirect effects 
(which are the basis of the corresponding multiplier calculations). The induced effects reflect 
the fact that as demand expands, so too does labour income and households’ consumption 
expenditure, which further stimulates economic activity. The Type 2 entries represent the 
sum of the direct, indirect and induced effects. (These reflect all the income-consumption 
links in the base year SAM.) 
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Table 2. The economic impact of the total capital and current expenditures on new social 
housing: IO / SAM model estimates 
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Direct        
CAPEX        
Output (£m) 1,083.2 1,083.2 1,083.2 1,083.2 1,083.2 0.0 0.0 
GVA (£m) 470.2 470.2 470.2 470.2 470.2 0.0 0.0 
Employment (FTE) 7,433 7,433 7,433 7,433 7,433 0 0 
OPEX        
Output (£m) 0.0 15.0 30.0 45.1 60.1 75.1 75.1 
GVA (£m) 0.0 7.6 15.3 22.9 30.5 38.2 38.2 
Employment (FTE) 0 130 260 390 520 651 651 
Total         
Output (£m) 1,083.2 1,098.2 1,113.2 1,128.2 1,143.3 75.1 75.1 
GVA (£m) 470.2 477.8 485.4 493.1 500.7 38.2 38.2 
Employment (FTE) 7,433 7,563 7,693 7,823 7,953 651 651 
        
Direct plus 
indirect        
CAPEX        
Output (£m) 1,685.5 1,685.5 1,685.5 1,685.5 1,685.5 0.0 0.0 
GVA (£m) 725.8 725.8 725.8 725.8 725.8 0.0 0.0 
Employment (FTE) 11,504 11,504 11,504 11,504 11,504 0 0 
OPEX        
Output (£m) 0.0 33.8 67.5 101.3 135.1 168.9 168.9 
GVA (£m) 0.0 17.3 34.6 52.0 69.3 86.6 86.6 
Employment (FTE) 0 284 568 853 1,137 1,421 1,421 
Total         
Output (£m) 1,685.5 1,719.3 1,753.1 1,786.9 1,820.6 168.9 168.9 
GVA (£m) 725.8 743.1 760.4 777.7 795.0 86.6 86.6 
Employment (FTE) 11,504 11,788 12,072 12,356 12,641 1,421 1,421 
        
Direct plus 
indirect plus 
induced        
CAPEX        
Output (£m) 4,465.6 4,465.6 4,465.6 4,465.6 4,465.6 0.0 0.0 
GVA (£m) 1,938.5 1,938.5 1,938.5 1,938.5 1,938.5 0.0 0.0 
Employment (FTE) 30,624 30,624 30,624 30,624 30,624 0 0 
OPEX        
Output (£m) 0.0 61.5 123.1 184.6 246.1 307.6 307.6 
GVA (£m) 0.0 31.4 62.9 94.3 125.7 157.2 157.2 
Employment (FTE) 0 537 1,074 1,612 2,149 2,686 2,686 
Total         
Output (£m) 4,465.6 4,527.1 4,588.7 4,650.2 4,711.7 307.6 307.6 
GVA (£m) 1,938.5 1,969.9 2,001.4 2,032.8 2,064.2 157.2 157.2 
Employment (FTE) 30,624 31,161 31,698 32,236 32,773 2,686 2,686 
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The final nine rows of Table 2 summarise the economic impact of the new capital and current 
expenditure on social housing, including all direct, indirect and induced effects. There are a 
number of points worth noting about the results. 
Note that the increase in capital expenditure (CAPEX) is constant, at £1,083.2 million (in 2020 
prices) over the first five years of the project. The impacts of these expenditures are 
substantial, implying Type 2 multipliers of 4.12 for gross output, gross value added (GVA) and 
employment. The impact on total value-added (GDP) is also constant at £725.8 million per 
annum over 5 years. Gross output increases by £4,465.6 million and employment by 11,504 
full time equivalents (FTE), across each of the five years duration. After the 5 years the new 
expenditures cease and there is no further change in CAPEX. This reflects the fact that the 
stimulus to capital spending on social housing is transitory and that, within the IO/SAM model, 
all of the effects of spending occur within the year in which they occur. 
The operating expenditures (OPEX) are incurred over the entire lifetime of the new social 
housing, namely 40 years. While OPEX endure they do not begin until year 2 once construction 
activity in year 1 is complete and are of a much smaller magnitude than capital expenditures 
(although the Type 2 multipliers are of the same order of magnitude as for capital 
expenditure). OPEX builds up over the remaining four years of capital spend in line with the 
size of the new housing stock, reaching a maximum in year 6, when the increment to the 
housing stock is complete, after which expenditures are maintained at a constant £75.1 
million per annum. 
The total impacts (last three rows of Table 2) are simply the sum of capital and operating 
expenditures and so reflect both patters of effects identified above. The maximum impacts 
occur in year 5 since capital expenditure is still ongoing and operating expenditure has 
increased, with output, GVA and employment increasing by £4.7 billion, £2.1 billion and 32.8 
thousand respectively. Operating expenditures continue for the remaining life of the new 
social housing stock, generating £307.6 million output, £157.2 million GVA and 2,686 
employees per annum. 
The overall scale of the Type 2 multipliers reflects a very substantial contribution from the 
induced effects captured within the SAM. For example, Type 1 output multipliers are typically 
around 1.56 for capital expenditure and 2.2 for (the more sectorally distributed) operating 
expenditures. Accounting for induced effects more than doubles the estimated impact of 
capital spending. 
Cumulative impacts 
The first three rows of Table 3 summarise the cumulative impacts of the new CAPEX on social 
housing on GVA and employment. The total GDP impact of CAPEX, £9,692 million, is the sum 
of total GVA effects (reported in the penultimate row of Table 2) over the five years of capital 
spending. The total employment figure for CAPEX reflects the sum of FTE employment over 
the period, which is 153,120 FTE employment years. Probably a more meaningful indicator of 
employment impacts is the level of employment averaged over the five years, reported in the 
third row of Table 3. 
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The aggregate estimates for OPEX are calculated in an analogous manner, but over the full 
lifetime of the project. Notice that, although the OPEX expenditures in each year are small 
relative to the capital spend, their duration implies that they contribute a more important 
share of the cumulative total impact of the project (but, of course, they are not part of the 
new capital spend budget). 
Table 3. The cumulative impacts of the new spending on social housing on GDP and 
employment 
 
Capex 
IO/SAM 
direct 
IO/SAM 
 indirect 
IO SAM 
 induced 
IO/SAM 
Total 
GDP (£m) 2,351 1,278 6,064 9,692 
Employment (FTE)  37,163 20,356 95,601 153,120 
Employment (FTE per year av)  7,433 4,071 19,120 30,624 
OPEX     
GDP (£m) 1,604 2,033 2,964 6,601 
Employment (FTE)  27,326 32,355 53,136 112,817 
Employment (FTE per year av)  683 809 1,328 2,820 
Total      
GDP (£m) 3,955 3,311 9,027 16,293 
Employment (FTE)  64,489 52,711 148,737 265,937 
 
The simple summation of GDP impacts over time neglects the fact that the timing of GDP 
impacts matters in general. Given positive interest rates £1 received now is worth 
considerably more than £1 received 40 years from now. To account for this, Table 4 reports 
the present value (PV) of real GDP impacts 
Table 4. The present values of the cumulative impacts of the new spending on social housing 
on GDP (and employment) 
 
Capex 
IO/SAM 
direct 
IO/SAM 
 indirect 
IO SAM 
 induced 
IO/SAM 
Total 
GDP (£m) 2,197 1,194 5,667 9,059 
Employment (FTE)  37,163 20,356 95,601 153,120 
Employment (FTE per year av)  7,433 4,071 19,120 30,624 
OPEX     
GDP (£m) 780 988 1,441 3,208 
Employment (FTE)  27,326 32,355 53,136 112,817 
Employment (FTE per year av)  683 809 1,328 2,820 
Total      
GDP (£m) 2,977 2,183 7,108 12,267 
Employment (FTE)  64,489 52,711 148,737 265,937 
Note: We assume a 3.5% discount rate throughout. 
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Of course, all the GDP estimates in Table 4 are lower than those in Table 3, because all GDP 
changes after year one are now subject to a discounting process, the importance of which 
increases the further into the future such impacts arise. This is most evident from a 
comparison of the impact of the discounting process on CAPEX and OPEX. In the former case 
the impact is fairly modest (around 7%), whereas in the latter case PV is less than 50% of the 
simple sum of OPEX impacts on GDP. This, of course, reflects the fact that OPEX is distributed 
over 40 years, whereas CAPEX impacts apply only to the first five years and so are much less 
sensitive to the discounting process. 
The PV of the cumulative GDP effects is £12,267 million (compared to the simple cumulative 
sum of £16,293 million). 
So far, the reported results focus on the total impact of the spending on new social housing, 
whether funded by grant or privately. This, and issues relating to the financing of the grant 
element are revisited below.  
 
3. The demand-side impacts of social housing expenditures in the presence of capital 
and labour scarcity 
Recall that the IO/ SAM estimates of expenditure effects of new social housing investment 
typically assume the presence of both spare capacity and unemployment; neither capital nor 
labour are supply constrained.4 In this section we explore the consequence of such scarcity 
for the overall impacts of new expenditure on social housing. This requires the use of a 
Computable General Equilibrium (GCE) model which we briefly outline in the next section. 
We then explore the effects of capital and labour scarcity and, finally, compare these and our 
SAM results. 
An overview of the CGE model 
The CGE model is an eighteen-sector version of the AMOS modelling framework, calibrated 
on the same 2013 SAM used for the conventional impact analysis5.  In addition to the 18 
sectors/commodities, within the model there are three internal institutions - households, 
firms and governments - and two external, the rest of the UK (RUK) and the rest of the world 
(ROW). Scotland is considered a small, open economy so that external RUK and ROW prices 
are taken to be exogenous. Commodity markets are assumed to be competitive. Financial 
flows are not explicitly modelled, and the interest rate is assumed to be exogenously 
determined at UK level. 
The model allows for a degree of flexibility in the choice of model closures and parameters, 
the version used in this paper assumes myopic expectations. Fundamentally, the model 
assumes that producers minimise cost using a nested multilevel production function. The 
combination of intermediate inputs with RUK and ROW inputs is based on the Armington 
function (Armington, 1969). Output is produced from a combination of composite 
                                                          
4 The supply of labour can also be assured, in the long-run, by the presence of interregional migration. 
5 Full model listing can be found in Figus et al (2018).  
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intermediates and value added, where labour and capital combine in a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function to produce value added, allowing for substitution between these 
factors in response to relative price changes. 
There are four components of final demand in the model: household consumption, 
investment, government expenditure and exports. Household consumption is a linear 
function of real disposable income. Government expenditure is constant in the model, while 
exports are determined again based on an Armington function and so are dependent on 
relative prices.  
All simulations are run in a multi-period setting, with the periods interpreted as years as both 
the SAM and behavioural relationships are benchmarked using annual data. The model is 
initially assumed to be in steady-state equilibrium, implying that with no exogenous 
disturbance, the model simply replicates initial values over all subsequent time periods.  
The supply side of the economy determines the use of capital and labour in the model. Capital, 
in the first period, is fixed but in subsequent periods each sectors sector’s capital stock is 
updated through investment, which responds partially to the gap between the desired and 
actual (adjusted for depreciation) levels of capital stock – in line with the neoclassical 
investment formulation (Jorgenson, 1963). 
There are three wage closures available within the model – fixed nominal wage, fixed real 
wage and wage bargaining. In the wage bargaining closure the wage rate is inversely related 
to the unemployment rate: 
ln [
𝑤𝑠
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑠
]  =  𝑐 − 0.113ln[𝑢𝑠] (1) 
 
From Equation 1 c is a calibration parameter with ws the net of tax nominal wage, us the 
unemployment rate and cpis the consumer price index. The real wage is indirectly related to 
the log of unemployment with an elasticity of -0.113 – from Layard (1991). 
As the focus of the paper is impacts of constructing and operating affordable housing along 
with associated supply impacts, the housing market is not explicitly modelled within the CGE. 
Rather the costs of construction/operation are introduced as demand shocks to the relevant 
sectors and the supply impacts are modelled as productivity changes.   
 
The impact of capital scarcity 
We begin by assuming that labour is freely available at the prevailing real wage, so that capital 
is the only source of scarcity. Applying the same set of expenditure shocks to the CGE model 
generates the results summarised in Table 5. 
Table 5 The economic impact of the total capital and current expenditures on new social 
housing: CGE model estimates with passive labour supply (percentage change from 
base; £million for GDP; FTE for employment) 
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Fixed real wage  SR 
Year 5 (end of 
CAPEX) 
Year 45 (end of 
OPEX) LR 
GDP  0.25% 0.53% 0.06% 0.00% 
GDP (£m) 330.62 713.02 76.90 0.00 
Household Consumption 0.30% 0.38% 0.03% 0.00% 
Investment 1.17% 0.88% 0.06% 0.00% 
Total Exports 0.86% 1.20% 0.11% 0.00% 
Export RUK -0.62% -0.39% 0.00% 0.00% 
Export ROW 3.28% 3.80% 0.28% 0.00% 
Total Imports 0.94% 0.77% 0.05% 0.00% 
Nominal wage  0.17% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Wage 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CPI 0.17% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unemployment rate -0.37% -0.57% -0.05% 0.00% 
Employment  0.39% 0.60% 0.06% 0.00% 
Employment (FTE) 9,681 14,883 1,362 0 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.17% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government 
Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
In this case, as before, the stimulus to new social housing expenditure increases demand, 
which in turn increases consumption and general investment expenditure and stimulates 
GDP, by 0.25% or £330.6 million, and employment, by 0.39% or 9,681 FTEs in the short-run 
(Year 1). However, given that sectoral capital stocks are fixed in the short-run (SR) rental 
rates/ profits are bid up as a consequence. While the real wage is by assumption unchanged 
the increase in rental rates pushes up prices as reflected in the increase in the CPI of 0.17%. 
This induces a loss of competitiveness, reflected in a decline in exports and an increase in 
imports, which partially crowds out the initial stimulus. This accounts for the much smaller 
year 1 impact in this case as compared to the IO results reported in the final rows of the first 
column of Table 2. 
From the second period onwards the impact on GDP gradually increases as capital stocks rise 
in response to the increase in investment stimulated by the increase in rental rates. However, 
the investment process is extended with capital stocks adjusting only partially each year to 
gaps between their actual and desired levels. As the supply side restrictions relax a little the 
real effects on GDP, consumption and employment increase, while the pressure on prices 
relaxes somewhat. However, the capital expenditure on social housing ceases in year 5, long 
before the full adjustment in other capital stocks can be completed. In fact, capital stock 
adjustments continue beyond the end of operating expenditures given the gradual 
adjustment process, so that there are “legacy effects” for a number of years, and also beyond 
the end of operational expenditures in year 45. However, ultimately, the impact of even the 
operational expenditures falls to zero; hence the long-run, zero-impact results reported in 
Table 4 (and in Figure 1). 
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As in the IO case, peak effects occur in year 5, with GDP increasing by 0.53% (£713.02 million) 
but unlike in the IO case, these impacts do not fall off dramatically in year 6 – there is a more 
gradual adjustment despite the ending of the capital spending. Again, there are legacy effects 
associated with the new social housing capital expenditure that extend beyond the 
completion of that spending. This is apparent from a comparison of the IO/ SAM results in 
Figure 1 (where IO Type 1 results report only the direct and indirect effects, whereas the IO 
Type 2 results allow for endogenous household incomes impact on consumption) with those 
of the fixed real wage (Fixed RW) CGE model simulation.  
 
Figure 1. The impact of increased capital and operating expenditures on GDP for various 
IO/SAM and CGE models. 
 
The most dramatic difference from the IO results, which is again apparent from Figure 1, is 
the fact that the scale of the impacts is very substantially below that implied by the IO/ SAM 
results. The IO/ SAM Type 2 results suggest a maximum GDP impact in period 5 of £2.06 
billion, whereas according to the CGE results it is £713 million. Relaxation of the assumption 
of excess capacity has a major impact on estimated results. 
The cumulative sum of the GDP impact in this case is £5.18 billion and its present value is 
£4.20 billion compared to £9.69 and £9.06 billion for the SAM/IO case. The greater impact of 
discounting on the estimated present value of GDP in the CGE case again reflects the time 
distribution of the impacts, as is apparent from Figure 1.  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50
G
P
D
 (
£
m
ill
io
n
)
Fixed NW Fixed RW Bargaining IO Type 1 IO Type 2
13 
 
The impact of capital and labour scarcity 
In general, we might expect increased demand to enhance workers’ bargaining power, 
stimulate employment, reduce unemployment and thereby generate a rise in real wages. 
There is considerable evidence, over the longer term, that real wages are inversely related to 
the unemployment via a wage curve that reflects the impact of bargaining power on real 
wages. Of course, if this relationship holds it reinforces the tendency for prices to rise due to 
capital fixity: labour as well as capital are scarce in this case and so the adverse impact on 
competitiveness is greater.6 
Not surprisingly, the scale of estimated impacts declines further if we allow wages to respond 
to the fall in unemployment implied by the results in Table 5. While we have noted that there 
are doubts about the applicability of this “bargaining” case in present circumstances, it is 
useful to consider its implications.  If the wage curve relationship is restored then we would 
expect the enhanced bargaining power of workers to lead to pressure for higher wages.  The 
results in Table 6 confirm this. 
 
Table 6. The economic impact of the total capital and current expenditures on new social 
housing: CGE model estimates with labour and capital scarcity (percentage change 
from base; £million for GDP; FTE for employment) 
Bargaining wage  SR 
Year 5 (end of 
CAPEX) 
Year 45 (end of 
OPEX) LR 
GDP  0.14% 0.27% 0.02% 0.00% 
GDP (£m) 189.23 364.47 31.40 0.00 
Household Consumption 0.36% 0.41% 0.03% 0.00% 
Investment 0.84% 0.45% 0.03% 0.00% 
Total Exports 0.69% 0.82% 0.06% 0.00% 
Export RUK -0.78% -0.75% -0.05% 0.00% 
Export ROW 3.10% 3.40% 0.23% 0.00% 
Total Imports 0.96% 0.81% 0.05% 0.00% 
Nominal wage  0.62% 0.77% 0.05% 0.00% 
Real Wage 0.36% 0.46% 0.03% 0.00% 
CPI 0.26% 0.31% 0.02% 0.00% 
Unemployment rate -0.19% -0.24% -0.02% 0.00% 
Employment  0.20% 0.25% 0.02% 0.00% 
Employment (FTE) 4,912 6,216 441 0 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.26% 0.31% 0.02% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government 
Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
The qualitative effects reported in Table 6 are very similar to those already described for the 
results reported in Table 5. However, here even in the short-run the real wage is pushed up 
(by 0.36%) and the CPI increases by substantially more than previously (0.26% as compared 
                                                          
6 If we were to consider income-tax-funded grant financing that would introduce a further potentially negative 
effect, namely wage bargainers’ responses to the rise in income tax rates. 
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to 0.17%). This induces a greater loss of competitiveness, reflected in a greater decline in 
exports and larger increase in imports (despite a smaller increase in GDP). The degree of 
crowding out of the initial stimulus increases in the short-run as a consequence of the impact 
of labour market tightening on the real wage. 
Again, subsequently the impact on GDP gradually increases as capital stocks rise in response 
to the increase in investment and consumption and employment continue increase, but the 
impacts are moderated by gradually increasing pressure on the real wage. Again capital stocks 
continue to adjust beyond the end of period 5 as do the impacts of capital expenditure on the 
on GDP (Figure 1) and employment (Figure 2) for this Bargaining case. 
 
Figure 2. The impact of increased capital and operating expenditures on employment for 
various IO/SAM and CGE models. 
 
As in the previous CGE case, the economic impacts fall off more gradually from year 6 than is 
the case with IO; there is a more gradual adjustment process despite the ending of the capital 
spending. Legacy effects of the new social housing capital expenditure extend beyond the 
cessation of spending. We find for the fixed real wage case legacy employment of 2,448 FTEs, 
and 373 FTEs in the bargaining case, that are generated in years 46-50 after all expenditures 
cease. 
The scale of the impacts of the expenditure stimulus is substantially below that implied by the 
IO/ SAM results. Recall that the SAM results suggest a maximum GDP impact in period 5 of 
£2.06 billion, whereas according to the CGE results it is £713 million if real wages are fixed 
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and  only £364 million (implying a value-added multiplier of less than unity) if real wages 
respond to labour market tightening.7  
The results so far assume that real government expenditure is unchanged by the increase in 
spending on social housing, despite the fact that it generates an increase in tax revenue – 
including the revenues of taxes that are now devolved to the Scottish Government. Allowing 
for the recycling of these taxes permits the Scottish Government to increase its real 
expenditure, by 0.25% in the fixed real wage case and by 0.35% under wage bargaining when 
activity is at a peak (year 5). This creates a further (more labour intensive) demand stimulus, 
so that GDP and employment impacts are enhanced, with GDP rising by 0.27% (0.16%) in the 
short run and 0.58% (0.30%) in the peak year for the fixed real wage (bargaining) case. 
The present values of the GDP impacts are, of course, also increased to £5.79 billion in the 
fixed real wage case and £2.45 billion under bargaining. 
Overall comparison of cumulative demand side impacts across different models 
Table 7 summarises the present value of GDP impacts of the new expenditure on social 
housing over the lifetime of the project for a number of models. As we have already noted 
caution should be exercised in interpreting the employment results: these are simply the sum 
of (undiscounted) FTE employment years over the lifetime of the project. However, for capital 
and operational expenditures separately we also report the more meaningful average 
employment impact over five years and the lifetime of the project. The purpose is to provide 
a brief overview of economic impacts of the demand stimulus (based on a 40-year lifetime of 
new housing). 
 
Table 7. Comparison of total economic impacts across different models (Present value of 
GDP; employment in FTE years or averaged over 5 years (CAPEX) or life of project (OPEX)8 
 
Capex 
IO/SAM 
direct 
IO/SAM 
 indirect 
IO SAM 
 
induced 
IO/SAM 
Total 
Fixed  
nominal 
Fixed  
real wage Bargaining 
GDP (£m) 2,197 1,194 5,667 9,059 3,769 3,531 1,551 
Employment (FTE)  37,163 20,356 95,601 153,120 97,792 97,488 31,706 
OPEX        
GDP (£m) 780 988 1,441 3,208 1,835 1,820 715 
Employment (FTE)  27,326 32,355 53,136 112,817 51,896 49,680 17,277 
Total         
GDP (£m) 2,977 2,183 7,108 12,267 5,604 5,351 2,266 
                                                          
7 Note that in the bargaining case the rise in real wages and fall in the unemployment rate could induce in-
migration, which would tend to relax the labour supply constraint and so push the macroeconomic results 
more towards those reported for the fixed real wage case. 
8 The impacts attributed to OPEX in the CGE simulations are obtained by subtracting the CAPEX from the Total 
impacts. (The non-linearity of the CGE model implies that the impact of OPEX and CAPEX considered 
separately do not exactly add to the estimated impact of the total new capital expenditure on social housing.) 
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Employment (FTE)  64,489 52,711 148,737 265,937 149,688 147,168 48,983 
Capex Employment 
(FTE per year 5 
average)  
7,433 4,071 19,120 30,624 14,536 12,515 5,657 
Capex Employment 
(FTE per year 50  
average) 
- - - - 1,956 1,950 634 
Opex Employment  (FTE 
per year average)  
683 809 1,328 2,820 1,153 1,104 384 
        
 
Table 7 summarises the cumulative effects on the present value of GDP and on FTE 
employment years (and average employment) across the four models we have already 
discussed plus an additional one which assumes a Fixed Nominal Wage. This is another variant 
of the labour market representation within the CGE model. It basically assumes that wage 
bargaining is conducted at the national level in the UK, and Scotland acts as a nominal wage 
taker. In the face of the demand expansion considered here the fixed nominal wage implies 
that the real wage actually falls slightly as the cpi rises, and this moderates the adverse 
competitiveness effects – albeit to a modest degree in this case. 
Note that the last three columns relate to the CGE simulations, which incorporate all indirect 
and induced effects, but do not separately identify them. Accordingly, these results should be 
compared to the IO/ SAM Total in the fourth column. The main message of Table 7 is that the 
estimated cumulative economic impacts of the expenditure on social housing depends 
importantly on what is assumed about the supply side. Across all models there is a significant 
increase in (the PV of) GDP, but the estimated effects are substantially greater under the IO/ 
SAM assumptions of a totally passive supply side. Furthermore, the tighter the supply side 
restrictions the smaller the impact of the demand stimulus on the real economy. In the 
IO/SAM model the PV of GDP is estimated to be £12.3 billion, which is 2.3 times the estimate 
from the fixed nominal wage model and 5.6 times that of the bargaining model. The 
differences in cumulative FTE employment years is not as dramatic, but the IO/SAM results 
are 5.4 and 1.8 times the estimates of the corresponding CGE models. The average 
employment impact over the 5 years of capital spending is 265.9 thousand according to the 
IO/SAM model, an estimate which is 1.6 times the estimate of the fixed nominal wage model 
and 4.9 times that of the bargaining model. For operating expenditures the IO/SAM estimate 
of the associated average annual employment impact is 2820 FTEs, which is 2.4 times the 
corresponding estimate for the fixed nominal wage case, but over 7 times the bargaining case.  
If the expenditures were to occur in a coronavirus-hit economy (once lockdown restrictions 
relax), the entirely passive supply side might seem a reasonable starting assumption since 
there is considerable excess capacity and unemployment. However, we would expect that as 
the economy gradually recovers, capacity and labour market constraints may become more 
important. Determining the “appropriate” assumptions about the supply side in present 
circumstances is clearly a matter of judgement.   
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It may well be the case that the assumptions about wage responses could vary through time 
with excess capacity in the initial years, which gradually diminishes with a return to a situation 
in which supply constraints begin to bite. However, such a process would be difficult to 
capture within the CGE (at least for transitory expenditure changes), and so the outcomes 
would likely reflect some weighted average of the cases explored above. The very uncertainty 
surrounding the appropriate treatment of labour availability and existing capacity motivates 
the adoption of a range of possibilities here. However, prevailing circumstances provide a 
more compelling motivation for favouring results towards the IO/SAM end of the spectrum. 
Of course, as we have already noted the scale of the macroeconomic impacts are further 
increased if the endogeneity of government revenues and their recycling to current 
government expenditure is accommodated. 
 
 
4.  Attributing impacts between grant-funded and non-grant-funded expenditures 
Extracting grant-funded expenditure 
Recall that the most common, but typically implicit, assumption in impact studies is that new 
expenditure is funded through some increase in the intergovernmental transfer of funds to 
the Scottish Government through the Barnett mechanism. Here there is (as a first 
approximation) no cost to the Scottish people or Government. In this instance we can easily 
assess the impact of grant-funding by hypothetically extracting it from the estimated total 
impact. The extraction is hypothetical because the private funding can only be encouraged as 
a consequence of the grant funding.9 Operational expenditures are unaffected, since these 
are tied to the total increase in the stock of social housing.  
Grant funding varies between housing associations and local authorities (Dunning et al 2020, 
Table 7.3, p70). We assume that the 7,000 units are split between 68:32 between housing 
associations (Has) and local authorities (Las), reflecting the distribution between the two in 
recent years. Applying this split to the five markets in Dunning (2020, Table 7.3) gives annual 
totals of 4,800 HA units and 2,200 LA units. The grants for Has are as set out in the third 
column of Table 7.3, headed ‘RSL Social Rent – Greener Benchmark’. For example, the grant 
in Market 1 is £72,000 per unit while in Market 3 it is £74,000 per unit. The grants for Las are 
a uniform £59,000 per unit (advice from Shelter). This allows us to estimate the grant-funded 
element of the new capital spending on social housing as £489.9 million, so that non-grant-
funded expenditure is £593.3 million (giving a total of £1083.2 million) per annum. The results 
of applying this stimulus to expenditure are reported in Table 8. 
 
 
                                                          
9 This is a very straightforward example in which we only hypothetically extract an element of final demand. In 
the wider IO/SAM literature the term typically refers to whole or partial extraction of a particular sector or 
sectors. 
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Table 8. The cumulative economic impacts of non-grant-funded expenditure on social 
housing (PV for GDP; total employment years; average total employment years) 
 
 
IO/SAM 
direct 
IO/SAM 
 
indirect 
IO SAM 
 
induced 
IO/SAM 
Total 
Fixed  
nominal 
Fixed  
real 
wage Bargaining 
GDP (£m) 1,983 1,643 4,545 8,170 3,722 3,542 1,527 
Employment (FTE)  47,681 43,505 105,500 196,686 106,965 104,668 35,188 
Capex Employment (FTE per 
year 5 average)  
4,071 2,230 10,473 16,774 8,233 7,078 3,218 
Capex Employment (FTE per 
year 50 average 
- - - - 1,111 1,108 362 
Opex Employment  (FTE per 
year average)  
683 809 1,328 2,820 1,142 1,094 379 
 
 
While the capital expenditure stimulus in this case is only 55% of the total expenditure on 
new social housing, the impacts as a share of total cumulative impacts are substantially in 
excess of this. So the privately funded expenditure generates 67% of the discounted GDP 
impact in the IO/SAM model and a very similar share of the corresponding GDP impacts 
implied by the various CGE models. This reflects the fact that we assume that the OPEX 
expenditures are the same in both cases, and this limits the loss of GDP associated with the 
smaller, privately funded share of capital spending. In fact, the non-grant-funded share of the 
total FTE employment years impact is even greater – 74% in the IO/SAM model and over 71% 
in each of the CGE models. The greater employment shares reflect the fact that the 
employment intensity of OPEX is greater than that for CAPEX (which here falls relative to OPEX 
and to the shock analysed in Table 3) 
The impact of funding the grants through reduced public expenditure 
What if the grant component of new expenditure on social housing has to be directly funded 
by the Scottish Government? Given restrictions on borrowing the Government can either 
reduce other government expenditure or seek to raise revenue by increasing devolved tax 
rates. We consider it very unlikely that the Scottish Government would choose to alter tax 
rates – most obviously the income tax rate – to fund purely transitory expenditures, so we 
focus primarily on the case where the funding comes through a reduction in Government 
spending. Table 9 provides summary results for the cumulative impact of the new social 
housing, which is funded by an across the board reduction in current government expenditure 
(the composition of which is the same as that in our base year data).10 That is to say that we 
impose a shock to the model that comprises a £1083.2 million per annum stimulus to new 
social housing (as is the case for Section 3) and a simultaneous reduction in current 
                                                          
10 For simplicity we assume that current government expenditure has no immediate supply side impact. Of 
course, this is questionable for e.g. aspects of education expenditure, which represent an investment in human 
capital. 
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Government spending of £489.9 million (to fund the grant element of total spending on 
housing). 
 
Table 9. The cumulative economic impacts of new expenditure on social housing, where the 
grant element is funded by a reduction in current Government spending (PV for GDP; total 
employment years; average total employment years) 
 
IO/SAM 
direct 
IO/SAM 
 
indirect 
IO SAM 
 
induced 
IO/SAM 
Total 
Fixed  
nominal 
Fixed  
real wage Bargaining 
GDP (£m) 
1,575 1,768 3,018 6,362 3,277 3,113 1,573 
Employment (FTE)  24,416 41,138 32,124 97,678 90,945 88,486 29,929 
Capex Employment (FTE 
per year average)  
-582 1,757 -4,202 -3,028 3,810 3,215 1,502 
Capex Employment (FTE 
per year 50 average 
- - - - 790 784 257 
Opex Employment  (FTE 
per year average)  
683 809 1,328 2,820 1,144 1,096 379 
 
It is useful to compare these results with those of Table 8, which simply extract the grant-
funded expenditure. The IO/SAM model now suggests that the PV of GDP would be £6.4 
billion, only 78% of the £8.2 billion implied by simple extraction. The difference reflects the 
fact that the GDP multiplier associated with general current government spending is greater 
than that associated with new capital spending on social housing; substituting the latter for 
the former reduces the overall GDP impact. 
In fact, the cumulative employment impact, of 97,678 FTE employment years, is only 50% of 
the estimated impact using the simple extraction method, a reflection of the very labour 
intensive nature of public administration. Indeed, the difference in labour intensities is so 
great that substitution of the capital spending on social housing for current spending on 
government expenditure causes a fall in average employment of 3,028 FTEs per annum 
associated with the former.  
The same qualitative cumulative impacts on the PV of GDP and on FTE years are observed for 
the two “fix-wage” CGE simulation results, but the scale of the difference is much reduced. 
The qualitative effects continue to reflect the different compositions of current government 
expenditure and new spending on social housing. But here the PV of GDP is estimated to be 
88% of the impact under simple extraction and cumulative FTE employment years is 85% of 
its corresponding level. The price flexibility of these CGE models moderates the impact of 
negative demand shocks on the real economy (the reduction in government expenditure) as 
well as the impact of positive ones (the increase in expenditure on new social housing). 
Indeed, the bargaining model even registers a slight increase in GDP (of around 3%); net, the 
flexibility of prices and real wages in this case generates a positive impact. 
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It should be noted, however, that there are likely to be elements of total government 
spending (such as expenditure on roads) that are closer in character to investment in new 
social housing. The results of financing the housing grants through reductions in government 
spending does, in general, depend importantly upon the assumed composition of such 
spending.  
The impact of funding the grants through a rise in income taxation 
While we do not regard income-tax-financing of the temporary grant expenditures to be 
realistic, we illustrate the possibility through the bargaining CGE model, since this is the 
context in which workers bargain for a net of tax real wage.11 The temporary rise in the 
income tax rate required to fund the grant element of the overall expenditure on new social 
housing stimulates an adverse supply shock through workers seeking to restore their real take 
home wage. This operates simultaneously with a transitory reduction in consumption 
demand in response to lower disposable incomes, although this is dominated by the (larger) 
increase in non-grant-funded expenditure. The overall impact depends on the strength of the 
adverse supply effect relative to the (net) demand stimulus. In general, the net outcome of 
these forces is an empirical issue, but given that here the tax rise has to cover less than half 
of the total expenditure stimulus, we would anticipate that the change would still have an 
overall expansionary impact on the economy.  
Simulating the joint impact of the transitory capital and permanent operation expenditures 
on new social housing with an increase in the income tax rate sufficient to fund the grant 
element of capital spending does indeed reveal an overall expansionary impact with the PV 
of GDP rising by £1.5 billion, or 96% of the corresponding figure for the government 
expenditure funded grant case (Table 8). However, the cumulative employment effect is 
estimated to be 35 thousand FTE employment years, which is 17% higher than the estimate 
when grants are funded by reduced government expenditure. This method of funding avoids 
any contraction in the very labour intensive public sector, and so improves the employment 
outcome. 
The main message of the current analysis is that the demand-side impact of housing is clearly 
sensitive to assumptions about how it is financed. Furthermore, where funding is through 
reductions in government spending the composition of that spending may be critical to the 
overall economic impact of the investment in new housing. 
 
5. Model estimates of the likely supply-side impacts of new social housing. 
 
The previous section explored the expenditure/ demand-side impacts of the investment in 
new social housing. While these demand-induced, supply side responses are adverse in that 
they act to moderate the effects of new expenditure of social housing on economic activity, 
there may also be positive supply side effects associated with such investment.  We discuss 
                                                          
11 See Emonts-Holley et al (2018). 
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these effects and their possible scale next. We then present the results of the supply side 
simulations. 
Supply side impacts of new social housing 
McLennan et al (2019) explore two major supply side mechanisms, both of which reflect the 
fact their focus is on housing investments that brought occupants closer to local labour 
markets. One emphasises the impact of housing investment on travel to work costs and 
effective labour supply. The second focusses on the effect of housing investment on labour 
productivity through better job matching. While it is clear that the planned new Scottish 
investment in social housing is going to be concentrated in urban areas it is not clear that the 
same kind of improved spatial “access” for both suppliers and demanders of labour will be a 
key feature. Furthermore, we do not have the data to facilitate Scottish-specific estimates of 
these effects. It is also worth noting that while the Australian study focusses essentially on 
the impact of households changing locations, here the emphasis is on providing housing for 
the homeless. 
This emphasis on the homeless suggests alternative plausible routes through which the 
expenditures could stimulate the supply side of the economy - through increases in labour 
supply and labour productivity. While the same variables are impacted as in the Australian 
case, the transmission mechanisms are rather different and more directly related to Shelter’s 
primary objectives. 
The increase in labour supply 
First, consider the possible impact on labour supply that would result from targeting the new 
social housing exclusively at the homeless.12 The employment rate among homeless people 
is around 30% (Bramley et al, 2019), while among the general population it is around 75%. 
We know that moving from homelessness to being housed results in people being more likely 
to secure and to sustain employment (e.g. Bridge et al, 2003; Whelen and Ong, 2008). Thus, 
there is a plausible argument that building the houses and moving people into homes will lead 
to a rise in labour supply and in employment. There were 43,206 people in Scotland who were 
homeless (in 2018-19), of whom 14,043 were children. Assume the remaining 29,163 were of 
working age. Currently, around 8,750 of them are working. If we assume that when people 
are housed the employment rate among the previously-homeless increases from ~30% to 
53% (i.e. halfway between 30% and 75%), this would add 6,708 to Scottish labour supply. 
 
Table 10 summarises the calculation of the increase in labour supply in each year of the 
expenditure on new social housing. The first column summarises the position prior to the 
start of the new spending. The first row identifies the number of units available corresponding 
to the year indicated by the column heading. (This increases by 7,000 in each of the five years.) 
The second row identifies the number of adults impacted (on the assumption of one per 
                                                          
12 Of course, this is a simplifying assumption, which in effect would mean the current stock of homeless people 
could be fully housed with the investment in social housing. 
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household). The third row identifies the number of these adults who would be employed if 
they retain the employment rate of the homeless (30%). The fourth row identifies the number 
of these adults who will be employed if the employment rate of previously homeless adults 
increases to 53%. The implied increase in employment – the difference between employment 
in the fourth and third rows – is reported in row five. Finally, this is added to total employment 
in the previous period to yield total current employment.  
 
As noted above, the impact on labour supply builds up to 6,708 FTE equivalents by year 6 (a 
0.257% increase) and remains at that level for the lifetime of the new increment to the social 
housing stock. The time pattern of the shock applied to the CGE model is the percentage 
increased in labour supply implied by the final row of 10. 
 
Table 10. The impact of the new social housing on total labour supply. 
 
  
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
No of units operational 0 7,000 14,000 21,000 28,000 35,000 
Adults 0 7,000 14,000 21,000 28,000 29,163 
Current homeless in 
employment 
0 2,100 4,200 6,300 8,400 8,749 
New homeless 
Employment 
0 3,710 7,420 11,130 14,840 15,456 
Difference 0 1,610 3,220 4,830 6,440 6,708 
Total current 
employment  
2,606,651 2,608,261 2,609,871 2,611,481 2,613,091 2,613,359 
Model Shock 1.00000 1.00062 1.00124 1.00185 1.00247 1.00257 
 
Source for human capital estimates: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/humancapitalestimates/2004to2
018/relateddata. Table 9. 
 
The stimulus to labour productivity 
 
A rather widespread literature (albeit much of it based on US evidence) provides reason to 
believe that homelessness in childhood leads to adverse labour market outcomes in 
adulthood and that the main transmission mechanisms are through education and health. 
Furthermore, Scottish data on human capital, summarised in Table 11 are wholly consistent 
with this view (although do not, of course, establish causality). 
 
It is clear from Table 11 that human capital outcomes for the “cared for/ homeless” lie 
significantly below those of the population as a whole. Most strikingly, some 41% of the 
Scottish population have a degree or equivalent qualification, compared to just 4% among 
the “cared for/ homeless”, and this is the group that has the highest human capital per head. 
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Table 11. Human capital per head: outcomes for the “cared for/ homeless” and for the 
population as a whole. 
 
 
Human capital per 
head (2018£) 
Outcomes 
(cared/homeless) 
Outcomes (full 
pop) 
Degree or equivalent £564,249 4% 41% 
Further education £452,506 45% 27% 
A level, GCSE grades A* - C or 
equivalent 
£446,632 27% 28% 
Other qualifications £398,204 10% 2% 
No qualifications £277,141 14% 2% 
 
Source for outcomes: https://www.gov.scot/publications/education-outcomes-looked-children-2017-
18/pages/4/ 
These data, together with base year employment estimates allow us to derive a number of 
measures of the stock of human capital. Column 1 of Table 12 calculates the human capital of 
the Scottish working population by category of qualification (using the information in columns 
1 and 3 of Table 11 and the estimate of total employment (2,606,501 FTEs). The second 
column estimates what the human capital of the cared for/ homeless children would 
ultimately become if they were to retain the educational outcomes of the homeless (using 
the information in columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 and the total number of homeless children 
(14,043)). This figure for the “homeless” represents around 4.7% of total human capital in 
Scotland. The final column is what the human capital of the previously homeless children 
could ultimately become if, in the long-run, they take on the characteristics of the population 
as a whole. (Here we use the information in columns 1 and 2 in Table 11, together with the 
total number of homeless children.) This would imply an estimated increase in the human 
capital of the previously homeless of £936 million or 0.073% of the total human capital of 
Scottish employment. This is the estimate of the productivity gain from greater social housing 
that we employ in our simulations below. 
Our simulation results should be regarded as illustrative for a number of reasons. First, we 
are assuming quite a radical change in behaviour given that the homeless are often associated 
with multiple deprivation characteristics. The previously homeless are being assumed to 
exhibit a 15.6% increase in productivity. However, the fact that the impact on labour 
productivity in Scotland as a whole is very small simply reflects the small numbers of homeless 
relative to total employment. Second, we focus only on the steady state impacts, which would 
apply only when all the children were old enough to enter the workforce with the assumed 
distribution of qualifications. 
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Table 12. The stock of human capital: outcomes for the “cared for/ homeless”, for the 
population as a whole and for the previously homeless (now in new social housing). 
 
 
Human capital (base 
full pop £m) 
Human capital (base 
homeless ) 
Human capital 
(Formerly 
homeless ) 
Degree or equivalent  603,028 317 3,249 
Further education 318,472 2,860 1,716 
A level, GCSE grades A* - C or 
equivalent 
325,980 1,693 1,756 
Other qualifications 20,760 559 112 
No qualifications 14,448 545 78 
Total 1,282,688 5,974 6,910 
    
Difference in homeless capital  936   
New capital full population 1,283,624   
Labour shock  1.000729957   
 
The results of the supply-side simulations. 
The first column of Table 13 summarises the long run results of implementing the labour force 
changes summarised in the final row of Table 10 to the CGE model, assuming that the real 
wage bargaining model captures the wage determination process. The eventual permanent 
0.26% stimulus to the labour force essentially reduces labour’s bargaining power at any given 
unemployment rate and so there is downward pressure on wages and prices. The nominal 
wage falls by 0.24% and the CPI by 0.09%, with the real wage falling by 0.15% (0.24%-0.09%). 
This improvement in competitiveness stimulates exports to the rest-of-the world (ROW) and 
the rest-of-the UK (RUK) by 0.22% and imports fall (by 0.01%). This ultimately raises GDP by 
0.15% or £207.8 million and employment by 0.17% or 4,240 FTEs. These effects are 
“permanent” in that they last as long as the new social housing stock (here assumed to be 40 
years). Note that, while employment increases, the unemployment rate actually rises. This 
reflects the fact that, while the real wage falls, it does not fall sufficiently to ensure that the 
whole of the increase in the labour force is absorbed by employment – that would require 
complete wage-inelasticity in labour supply (the exogenous labour supply case). 
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Table 13. The long-run effects of the labour supply and labour efficiency impacts of the 
new social housing. 
Long run  Labour supply 
Labour 
efficiency 
Labour 
total 
GDP  0.154% 0.069% 0.223% 
GDP (£m) 207.9 92.6 300.7 
Household Consumption 0.025% 0.011% 0.037% 
Investment 0.146% 0.065% 0.212% 
Total Exports 0.218% 0.097% 0.315% 
Export RUK 0.219% 0.098% 0.317% 
Export ROW 0.215% 0.096% 0.311% 
Total Imports -0.010% -0.004% -0.014% 
Nominal wage  -0.240% -0.034% -0.274% 
Real Wage -0.149% 0.007% -0.143% 
CPI -0.091% -0.040% -0.131% 
Unemployment rate 0.080% -0.003% 0.076% 
Employment  0.172% 0.004% 0.176% 
Employment (FTE) 4,240 90 4,332 
Real Scottish Government 
Consumption 
0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
    
Cumulative totals    
Present Value GDP (£m) 3,808.4 1,513.9 5,323.9 
Employment (FTE employment years) 173,400 814 174,240 
    
 
Of course, as is apparent from the final row of Table 10 the stimulus to labour supply builds 
up gradually and reaches a maximum during the fifth year of the programme and is then 
sustained. Naturally this pattern is reflected in the timing of the GDP and employment effects 
as is clear from Figure 3. Note, however, that the economic impacts of the increase in labour 
supply do not level off in year 6, when the shock reaches 0.26% (and is maintained at that 
level thereafter). At this point GDP is, at £135.3 million, some 65% of its long-run level of 
£207.9 million and employment is at 83% of its long-run level. It takes some time for the 
economy fully to respond to the labour supply stimulus. In particular, the stimulus leads to 
new investment and capital accumulation especially in those sectors impacted by improved 
competitiveness, and this adjustment process is protracted. 
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Figure 3. The impact of the stimulus to labour supply on GDP (£m) and employment (FTEs) 
 
 
The ultimate impact of the productivity stimulus generated by providing housing for homeless 
children is summarised in the second column of Table 13. In effect the stimulus to labour 
productivity reduces the price of an efficiency unit of labour and so increases the demand for 
labour in efficiency units. This reduces production costs and prices, so that the CPI here falls 
by 0.04%, and the improvement in competitiveness boosts exports by 0.10% and reduces 
imports. GDP ultimately increases by 0.07% or £92.6 million, and employment by 0.004% or 
90 FTEs. 
Figure 4 shows the time path of the response to a permanent 0.07% increase in productivity, 
which starts once the new capital stock is in place. Of course, this is not an attempt to capture 
the timing of the impacts of the productivity stimulus accurately, but is presented here simply 
to emphasise the nature of the employment response. Initially, employment actually falls in 
response to the productivity stimulus, reflecting that fact that less labour is now required to 
produce the same output. However, over time the competitiveness effects tend to stimulate 
employment and, as we have seen, this eventually increases. This reflects the fact that the 
responsiveness of labour demand to the real wage increases through time as capacity 
constraints relax and output (and employment) are able to expand further. In practice the 
adjustment paths are likely to be significantly more complex and subject to a much more 
gradual build up reflecting the age distribution of the initially homeless children and the 
extent of their investment in human capital. 
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Figure 4. The impact of the stimulus to labour productivity on GDP (£m) and employment 
(FTEs) 
 
 
 
The final column of Table 13 aggregates the long-run impacts of the labour supply and labour 
productivity stimuli. Of course, since the increase in labour supply has an impact on GDP and 
employment, for example, that is more than double that of productivity, the pattern of the 
aggregate results reflects that. For example, the unemployment rate increases. Overall, GDP 
increases by 0.22% (£300.7 million) and employment by 0.18% (4,332 FTEs). 
Note that the final row of Table 13 reports the Present Value (PV) of GDP for each of the 
simulations and for their combined effect. The PV of GDP associated with the labour supply 
stimulus is over 2.5 times that generated by the productivity stimulus, on the assumption that 
the time path was the hypothetical one depicted in Figure 5.2. Since in practice many of the 
productivity effects would not arise until later, in some cases much later, than assumed in 
Figure 4, the gap between the PV of GDP in the two cases is in fact likely to be significantly 
greater still. 
The supply side impacts allowing for the recycling of government revenues 
The simulation results reported in Table 13 assume that real Scottish Government 
expenditure is kept constant. This allows us to assess the impact of the labour supply and 
labour efficiency shocks in isolation. However, in both cases the revenues of the Scottish 
Government are stimulated by the increases in GDP and incomes that result. Furthermore, 
since the implementation of the Smith Commission recommendations the Scottish 
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Government (eventually) benefits from increases in devolved taxes (most notably income tax) 
and can use these revenues to increase current government expenditure. Table 14 presents 
the results of including the impact of endogenous tax revenues and their use to stimulate 
current government expenditure. Here we assume, for simplicity, that current government 
expenditure has no immediate supply side impacts; it represents a pure demand-side 
stimulus.13 
 
Table 14. The long-run effects of the labour supply and labour efficiency impacts of the 
new social housing, with devolved taxes recycled to increase government expenditure 
 
Long run  Labour supply 
Labour 
efficiency 
Labour 
total 
GDP  0.162% 0.074% 0.236% 
GDP (£m) 218.9 99.5 318.7 
Household Consumption 0.042% 0.022% 0.065% 
Investment 0.149% 0.067% 0.215% 
Total Exports 0.188% 0.078% 0.266% 
Export RUK 0.189% 0.078% 0.268% 
Export ROW 0.186% 0.077% 0.263% 
Total Imports 0.014% 0.011% 0.025% 
Nominal wage  -0.207% -0.013% -0.220% 
Real Wage -0.129% 0.020% -0.109% 
CPI -0.079% -0.032% -0.111% 
Unemployment rate 0.069% -0.010% 0.058% 
Employment  0.184% 0.011% 0.195% 
Employment (FTE) 4,525 273 4,802 
Transfers to HH from Gov -0.079% -0.032% -0.111% 
Real Scottish Government 
Consumption 0.111% 0.072% 0.183% 
    
Cumulative Totals    
GDP (£m) 4,031.2 1,642.4 5,676.9 
Employment (FTE employment years) 185,293 8,032 193,413 
 
 
The main difference from the results reported in Table 13 is the increase in real Scottish 
Government consumption reported in the final row of Table 14, which generates a further 
increase in GDP and employment in each case. The supply side shocks are now augmented 
with a positive demand shock as government spending increases. So GDP now increases by 
                                                          
13 Elements of government expenditure that are included in current spending in fact have some characteristics 
of investment expenditure, for example, spending on education and health. For simplicity here we abstract from 
any supply side impacts of current spending and assume that it is allocated in the same proportions as our base 
year data.  
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an additional £11 million in response to the labour supply stimulus and by a further £6.9 
million in response to the rise in productivity due to the increase in Government spending 
that is now facilitated by greater devolved tax revenues. The corresponding increases in 
employment are 285 FTEs and 183 FTEs respectively for the labour supply and productivity 
shocks. However, the demand stimulus tends to moderate the competitiveness gain, as in 
isolation it would tend to put upward pressure on wages and prices. Accordingly, the 
increases in net exports are reduced in this case relative to the results reported in Table 5.4. 
Comparison with demand-side impacts 
The most appropriate comparator for the supply side impacts reported above, which are 
based upon the bargained real wage model, are the demand side effects associated with the 
same model. However, it is interesting to consider how the scale of the supply impacts 
considered above, with the bargaining CGE model, relates to the demand side impacts 
identified by all of the models considered.  
Consider, first, the present value of GDP results reported in the last row of Table 13, which 
we compare with the demand-side results reported in the first row of Table 8. The PV of the 
GDP impact of the labour supply stimulus is £3.8 billion, or 46.6% of that associated with the 
IO/SAM model. However, this result is actually greater than the demand-side impacts as 
measured by the fix-wage CGE models - by 2.3% and 7.5% in the case of the fixed nominal 
and real wage cases respectively. Furthermore, the estimated labour supply impact on 
cumulative GDP is 2.4 times the impact on the demand side, estimated from the same 
bargaining model. 
The productivity impacts are, of course, smaller with a PV of GDP of £1.5 billion, but this still 
amounts to: 18.5% of the IO/SAM estimate of the PV of GDP; 40.7% of the fixed nominal wage 
case; 42.7% of the fixed real wage case and 99.1% of the bargaining case. The results for the 
total supply side impacts – the combination of labour supply and productivity effects – are 
naturally even more striking: the supply side impacts are 65.2% of the IO/SAM estimate of 
demand side effects, and actually exceed all of the CGE model estimates of demand side 
effects, by 40%-50% in the fix wage cases and by a factor of nearly 3.5 in the bargaining model. 
Note that demand and supply side impacts cannot simply be added together and this is 
especially so across different models. For example, the passive supply side assumption of the 
IO/SAM model would effectively preclude the possibility of the beneficial impact on labour 
supply since firms have all the labour they need at the prevailing wage rate anyway. It would 
be possible to combine demand and supply effects within a given CGE model, however. 
These results are striking and unexpected given how modest the supply side impacts appear 
to be in any given year. However, their persistence considerably enhances their cumulative 
impact, even after discounting. Of course, there are many questions about the precise scale 
of these supply side effects, but what appear to be plausible estimates raise serious questions 
about the appropriateness of neglecting supply side effects in conventional impact analyses 
and while the productivity estimate is undoubtedly too high (given that it assumes formerly 
homeless children take on the characteristics of the average child and must take some time 
to be established), recall that we have only allowed for this among formerly homeless children 
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(with no corresponding effect on adults). Furthermore, there may be other supply side 
factors, as those noted in Maclennan et al (2018a, 2018b, 2019), that would further enhance 
the supply side impacts. Certainly it seems inappropriate to neglect the potential supply side 
economic impacts of investment in social housing.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we develop and apply a framework which incorporates a number of 
improvements relative to conventional “impact analyses” of expenditure on (social) housing. 
First, we use a SAM-based model to analyse demand-side expenditure effects, which extends 
the IO approach that underlies the best of such analyses to provide a fuller account of income 
transfers among transactors and facilitates improved modelling of endogenous household 
consumption. Application to the expenditures required to meet projected social housing 
needs in Scotland over the next five years confirms major stimuli to economic activity and 
employment. 
Second, while our SAM analysis, like IO, is predicated upon an assumption of an entirely 
passive supply side, we also consider the likely impact on these estimates of allowing for price 
and wage flexibility (reflecting the presence of resource constraints) in response to the new 
expenditures on social housing. We show that this can substantially reduce estimated 
expenditure impacts. While it seems likely that the impact of COVID-19 has created excess 
capacity14 and labour market slack, providing some motivation for the simpler supply side 
assumptions of  SAM/ IO analysis, in general allowance for wage and price responses is likely 
to prove a significant extension.15 
Third, our analysis considers the impact of alternative methods of financing the new housing 
expenditures and attributing overall impacts between grant-funded and private-funded 
expenditures. This includes hypothetical extraction of grant-funding, reductions in 
government expenditure and a rise in income taxes, all of which generate significantly 
differentiated results. The source of funding matters for economic impact, but it is typically 
ignored in conventional impact analyses. 
Fourth, following Maclennan et al (2018a, 2018b, 2019) we make the case for analysing the 
supply-side impacts of new social housing. This is the first application in the UK, and the first 
to emphasise, and attempt to quantify, the potential beneficial supply-side economic impacts 
associated with housing the homeless. While these impacts appear to be modest on a per 
annum basis, their cumulative effect may be substantial because their impact is typically 
permanent.  
Finally, we allow for the fact that the current fiscal regime generates additional revenues from 
devolved taxes, resulting in more substantial demand and supply side impacts, since in all 
                                                          
14 Once lockdown restrictions are fully relaxed. 
15 Footnote on alternative motivation for passive supply for regional economy. 
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cases devolved tax revenues (per capita) rise, which allows an increase in current Government 
expenditure. This provides a further stimulus to demand. 
Overall, the answer provided by the paper to the question posed in its title is in the 
affirmative: the supply side impacts of housing expenditure really do matter, both in 
governing the likely responses to the associated demand stimulus, and in providing lasting 
stimuli through labour supply and productivity enhancements.  
While this study represents a significant extension of previous impact studies, much remains 
to be done to improve our understanding of the economic impact of social housing.  First, it 
would be useful to incorporate more explicit modelling of housing markets within the 
modelling frameworks. Second, there is considerable scope for improving both the 
identification and measurement of potential supply side impacts. Third, the approach could 
be extended to the multi-region case, which would allow the modelling of cities and their host 
regional economies to capture explicitly the spatial dimension emphasised by McLennan et al 
(2019). 
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